Georgia Investment Company v. Norman: The Supreme Court creates a New Form of Class Action for Georgia by HUNTER, Howard
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
1-1973
Georgia Investment Company v. Norman: The
Supreme Court creates a New Form of Class
Action for Georgia
Howard HUNTER
Singapore Management University, howardhunter@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
HUNTER, Howard. Georgia Investment Company v. Norman: The Supreme Court creates a New Form of Class Action for Georgia.
(1973). Mercer Law Review. 24, 447-478. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2117
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
Citation: 24 Mercer L. Rev. 447 1973 
Provided by: 
 
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Sun May 21 11:39:30 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
GEORGIA INVESTMENT COMPANY v. NORMAN-THE
SUPREME COURT CREATES A NEW FORM OF CLASS
ACTION FOR GEORGIA
By HOWARD 0. HUNTER*
INTRODUCTION
The recent decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in Georgia Invest-
ment Co. v. Norman' has raised a number of interesting and difficult
questions about the maintenance of class actions in the Georgia courts.
The Norman decision could have serious ramifications for courts, law-
yers and litigants in Georgia, and if its rationale should find acceptance
in other jurisdictions the effects could be much broader in scope.
The class action device can be an efficient and relatively inexpensive
method for the adjudication of similar claims of a large number of
persons in one proceeding. At its best, the class suit can work to the
advantage of both plaintiffs and defendants and it can ease the growing
problems of judicial administration. Small claimants who might not be
able to afford the expense of individual litigation may be able to obtain
redress through a class suit. The class action may also serve as an
enforcement tool for various statutes. The economic pressures of a large
class action may act as a deterrent to other potential defendants. The
defendant has the advantage of being able to litigate only once and thus
is freed from the problems of a multiplicity of lawsuits. Likewise, the
courts may be freed from the administrative difficulties of handling
many separate suits.
But at its worst, the class action device can create monumental prob-
lems for everyone involved. A class suit with thousands of people can
be an expensive administrative nightmare for the courts and the litigants
and prove lucrative only to the lawyers who are working on an hourly
fee basis. The federal courts have been subjected to so many class ac-
tions recently that some judges are becoming increasingly suspicious of
the motives of the lawyers for the class and of the validity of many of
the claims which are presented.
Today, however, many claims which simply did not exist have been
brought to life by our courts through the judicial act of allowing a class
action to be maintained. Although some courts say these claims are
* B.A., 1968. J.D., 1971, Yale University: Member, State Bar of Georgia; Associate, Hansell,
Post, Brandon & Dorsey, Atlanta, Ga.
I. 229 Ga. 160. 190 S.E.2d 48 (1972).
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not brought because plaintiffs believe the potential recovery would be
too small to justify the time and expense of litigation, the plain truth
is that in many cases Rule 23(b)(3) is being used as a device for the
solicitation of litigation. This is clearly an 'undesirable result' which
cannot be tolerated.2
Judge Edenfield's comments, quoted above, were directed to actions
brought under the federal class action rule,' which provides specific
guidelines for the maintenance of class suits. The Norman case, how-
ever, presents Georgia courts with the possibility of a multiplicity of
class actions without the benefit of a rule nearly as comprehensive as
the federal rule. If the federal courts are having problems, then the
Georgia courts can certainly be expected to have their share.
The purpose of this article is to examine some of the questions raised
by the Norman decision and to suggest ways in which the Georgia courts
might handle these problems. A number of other states have class action
rules similar to the Georgia rule. Hopefully, their courts will take a
more careful approach before plunging in as deeply as the Georgia
Supreme Court.
CLASS ACTIONS-A BRIEF HISTORY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS AND IN
GEORGIA PRACTICE
Class suits had their genesis in English equity practice at least as early
as the seventeenth century.' The purpose was to handle litigation in
which so many persons were interested that joinder was impracticable.
The class bill in equity found its way across the Atlantic and was dis-
cussed with approval by Justice Storey in his Commentaries on Equity.'
The United States Supreme Court gave its blessings to the equitable
class suit almost 120 years ago.
The rule is well established, that where the parties interested are
numerous, and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of
the body may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the others;
and a bill may also be maintained against a portion of a numerous
body of defendants, representing a common interest.'
2. Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
4. How v. Tenants of Broomsgrove. I Vern. 23, 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (1681). Other equity cases
of the period also recognized the class suit as a possible alternative to joinder. See Brown v.
Vermuden, I Ch. Cas. 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (1676); Brown v. Booth, I Eq. Cas. Abr. 164, 21
Eng. Rep. 960 (1690).
5. For a comprehensive treatment of early class action history and practice see Z. CHAFEE,
SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY (1950) and I J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918).
6. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302 (1853). This suit arose from the split of
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When the 1938 federal rules were adopted, rule 23 was specifically
devoted to class actions. With the merger of law and equity in the
federal courts, class suits were then available for both legal and equita-
ble relief.'
The 1938 federal rule divided class suits into three categories, which,
thanks to Professor Moore, came to be known as "true," "hybrid," and
"spurious" class suits.' Moore's terminology was based on the nature
of the juridical rights asserted by the members of the class and the res
judicata effects of a judgment in each of the three categories. Thus in a
true class suit the interest of the class members were "joint or com-
mon" 9 and the judgment was binding on all members of the class."0 In
a hybrid action the interests of the class members were several, but the
object of the suit was to adjudicate claims relating to specific property."
The judgment in a hybrid suit was binding only with respect to the
common property in question. 2 The spurious class suit was little more
than a permissive joinder device. The interests of the class were several,
and the members were bound together only by a "common question of
law or fact" and a desire for common relief."3 The binding effect of a
spurious suit extended only to the members of the class who were ac-
tually before the court. 4
Criticism of the classification scheme of the 1938 rule was legion."
The critics generally found the classifications to be vague and abstract. 6
the Methodist Church into northern and southern divisions. Plaintiff, who represented all traveling
preachers of the Methodist Church South, sought an accounting of a fund that had previously
belonged to the whole church,
7. See generally 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 256 et
seq. (1961) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HOLTZOFF].
8. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by The Preliminary Draft,
25 GEO. L.J. 551, 570 et seq. (1937).
9. Orig. Federal Rule 23(a)(l), 28 U.S.C, (1958).
10. 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.08 at 23-2505 et seq. [Hereinafter cited as "3B
MOORE"]; 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 3562.1, at 266-71.
II. Orig. Federal Rule 23(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. (1958).
12. 3B MOORE, 23.09 at 23-2571 et seq.; 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 562.2, at 272-73.
13. Orig. Federal Rule 23(a)(3), 28 U.S.C. (1958).
14. 3B MOORE, 23.10 at 23-2601 et seq. 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 562.3, at 274-85.
15. Even the praise was damning:
It may be admitted that the terminology shocks the aesthetic sense and the succession
of adjectives before the noun shows the poverty of imagination in choice of terms
characteristic of the legal profession. But back of the unedifying nomenclature there is
substance. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 1945).
16. See, e.g.. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, 245-65 (1950); Kalven & Rosenfield,
The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941); Weinstein, Revision
of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 433, 470 (1960); Note: Binding
Effect of Class Actions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1954); Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R.
Clv. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 et seq. (1965) [Hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee's Note].
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Courts were often involved in lengthy controversies over classification
with the result that the merits of a particular claim were often lost in a
procedural morass. 7 Rule 23 was completely rewritten in 1966, and a
more pragmatic and functional approach to classification was substi-
tuted for the former categories. 8
In order to maintain a class suit under the new rule, subdivision (a)
establishes four general prerequisites: (1) the class must be so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable;"9 (2) there must be ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the defenses or claims of
the representative parties must be fairly typical of the defenses or claims
of the class; and (4) the representatives must be such as will adequately
represent the interests of the class.
Once an action meets the general requirements of subdivision (a), it
then must also meet the more specific requirements of one of the three
classifications of subdivision (b). The classifications of subdivision (b)
bear some resemblance to the categories of the former rule, but there
are major differences.2 0 The new classifications are not based on the
nature of the juridical rights asserted by the members of the class, and
the res judicata effects of a judgment extend to all class members except
those who affirmatively request exclusion from an action maintained
under rule 23(b)(3).2
Revised rule 23(b)(1) permits a class suit to be maintained where the
prosecution of separate actions would result in the danger of: (1) "incon-
sistent of varying" standards for the members of the class or for the
class' opponent, or (2) adjudications which would, in effect, be disposi-
tive of the interests of other class members.
17. See, e.g.. Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952):
and the frustrating series of opinions in Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763
(E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 108 F.2d 51 (3rd Cir. 1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 282 (1940), on remand. 39 F. Supp.
592 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd sub nom., Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3rd
Cir. 1941).
18, FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For a good and early judicial discussion, see, e.g., Alvarez v. Pan
American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
19. Numerosity is a fairly flexible requirement. If a class suit seems to be the most efficient
method for the litigation, then even a small group is sufficient. See, e.g., Local 246, Utility Workers
v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 13 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 23a.2, Case I (C.D. Cal. 1969)-A class of
eight present members and another of two were sufficiently large to maintain a class suit charging
sexual discrimination in hiring practices because the classes also included all potential applicants
for jobs; Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969)-A class of
forty was sufficiently large where the members of the class were widely scattered and their interests
too small to warrant individual actions; Cypress v. Newport News Gen. and Nonsectarian Hosp.,
375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967)-No specific number of persons is necessary for a class.
20. See Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 670 (1965).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
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Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes a class suit when "a party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding dec-
laratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." The (b)(2) subdivi-
sion was written largely for the benefit of civil rights litigants,2 but it is
not designed exclusively for civil rights cases and may well be used by
other class litigants. For example, a group of consumers might file a
class suit against a merchant who used standardized fraudulent schemes
to cheat or otherwise to mistreat groups of consumers in the same
manner.
24
Finally, rule 23(b)(3) authorizes a class suit where "the court finds
that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy." Matters to be weighed by the
court in determining whether an action is properly maintainable as a
class suit under subdivision (b)(3) include: (1) the interests of individual
members of the class in prosecuting separate claims, (2) the extent of
any other litigation already commenced by or against the class or its
members, (3) the desirability of concentrating the litigation in a particu-
lar forum, and (4) the problems likely to be incurred in the management
of a class action. The court must also direct notice to absentee members
of a (b)(3) class to advise them that they will be included in the judgment
if they do not affirmatively request exclusion by a certain date and that,
if they wish, they can enter an appearance through counsel. 5
Georgia, following the English lead and that of the United States
Supreme Court, also early recognized the utility of the equitable class
suit. Bates v. Houston,2" an 1880 decision, involved a dispute over the
possession and use of church property. The African Methodist Episco-
pal Church in Savannah had broken up, and the two sides were arguing
over who should have the church property. Not all of the interested
parties were able to appear in court for the simple reason that there were
too many of them, and the Georgia Supreme Court reiterated the princi-
ple that "where numerous parties have a common interest a few may
sue representing the whole."2 7
22. Advisory Committee's Note at 104: 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 562, at 81 (Supp. 1969):
Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1216 (1966).
23. Advisory Committee's Note at 104.
24. Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 1968
Duke L.J. Ii01, 1121.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A)-(C).
26. 66 Ga. 198 (1880).
27. Id. at 202.
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Other cases followed the same line as Bates v. Houston. The leading
one was The Macon and Birmingham Railroad Co. v. Gibson.2" The
charter of the railroad company had been amended by the General
Assembly to provide that the line should be constructed through the
City of Thomaston. The owners of the railroad, however, wanted to
skirt Thomaston and build the line through an open area rather than
through a built up urban area. The Thomaston citizenry wanted the line
to come through the town for economic and commercial reasons, so two
of them sued on behalf of all the citizens of Thomaston to enjoin the
railroad from building its line out in the country. The supreme court
held that the whole community had a common interest in the location
of the railroad and that the action could be maintained on behalf of
them all by the two representatives. 9 The court specifically noted that
it was important that the representatives be such as would be adequate
to represent the interests of the whole class. It found that these two
gentlemen were adequate. 3 The Macon Railroad decision was codified
in Ga. Code Ann. § 37-1002 (Rev. 1962) as follows: "Members of a
numerous class may be represented by a few of the class in litigation
which affects the interests of all."
Although limited to the equity side of the courts, the old Georgia class
suit was given liberal treatment in the Georgia courts as indicated by
the following passage from a 1938 supreme court decision-the same
year that the federal rules were adopted.
[A] few of the members of an unincorporated association, such as a
trade union, may sue in the name or in behalf of all the members,
where all by virtue of their membership have a common right or inter-
est in the contract or other subject-matter of the suit. The fact that the
individual interests of the plaintiffs may in some respects differ, or that
all do not have an interest in all the matters embraced in such an
equitable suit, will not, as to individual plaintiffs, render the petition
multifarious or subject to attack for misjoinder of parties or causes of
action, if each of the plaintiffs has an essential interest common to all,
with a common connection and right against the defendant. Equity,
taking jurisdiction, will determine all of the matters in the controversy
and grant appropriate relief, equitable or legal, so as to do complete
justice between the parties."
The Georgia courts, like their federal counterparts, often used the
28. 85 Ga. I, II S.E. 442 (1890).
29. Id. at 22-23, I1 S.E. at 446.
30. Id. at 24, II S.E. at 446.
31. O'Jay Spread Co. v. Hicks, 185 Ga. 507, 512, 195 S.E. 564, 566 (1938).
[Vol. 24
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words "joint" and "common" without really coming to grips with what
they meant. The 1907 opinion in White v. North Georgia Electric Co."2
did attempt to make some sense of the meaning of "common" rights,
and although it is an old equity case, its rationale should be applicable
today. In equity, distinct and separate claims could not be joined in a
single action, but where one was asserting a "common" right against
many, or many against one, equity would determine the whole matter
in one action.3 The supreme court in the White case had to determine
whether the plaintiff's bill in equity was "demurrable for multifar-
iousness." (The streamlined modern rules of.procedure will never be a
match for the colorful language of the courts of Lords Coke and Ells-
mere and their descendants.) It stated that a "common right" may refer
to (I) a joint interest in a cause of action or, (2) separate interests in
the particular subject matter of the suit. 4 As an example of the first
category, the court described a suit upon a promissory note payable to
several persons instituted by the payees. For the second category, the
court gave as an example a suit by several creditors, each with a separate
claim, against an insolvent debtor for the purpose or marshalling the
assets of the debtor.35
With such an understanding of the definition of "common" rights,
"joint" rights and "separate" rights as can be gleaned from cases such
as White, the General Assembly in 1966 adopted the old federal rule
with its juridical right classifications as part of the new Civil Practice
Act. The Georgia rule is identical to the old federal rule in all respects
but one-the "spurious" class action is wholly absent. For whatever
reasons, that section simply does not exist in the Georgia CPA, and
while one may also question the rationale for adopting the old instead
of the new federal rule, the principal question here is whether the
Norman decision has created a "spurious" action in Georgia any-
way-or maybe even a (b)(3) type action.
THE BACKGROUND OF NORMAN
In a routine transaction similar to hundreds that occur every day
32. 128 Ga. 539, 58 S.E. 33 (1907).
33. GA. CODE ANN. § 37-1007 (Rev. 1962).
34. 128 Ga. at 541, 58 S.E. at 33.
35. Id. Georgia equity courts also recognized a quite permissive rule ofjoinder for parties and
claims. "There is no misjoinder of parties or of causes of action even if the petition concerns things
of a different nature against several defendants whose rights are distinct, if it sets forth one
connected interest among them all, centering in the point in issue in the case. Hermann v. Mobley,
172 Ga. 380, 158 S.E. 38 (1931). See also, Knox v. Reese, 149 Ga. 379, 100 S.E 447 (1919); Brown
v. Wilcox, 147 Ga. 546. 94 S.E. 993 (1918); and East Atlanta Land Co. v. Mower, 138 Ga. 380,
75 S.E. 418 (1912).
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across the country, Nathaniel Norman borrowed $2,000 from a small
commercial loan company. He executed a standard form promissory
note and gave the loan company a deed to secure debt on certain real
estate as security for the loan. Small loan companies have traditionally
charged high interest rates and have acquired a somewhat unsavory
reputation over the years, a reputation which is not wholly justified.
Whatever the morals of charging high rates for the use of money-and
our society has always frowned on "money-lenders" and "usurers" as
being low characters-the truth is that such loan companies do perform
a significant economic function. They make money available to persons
who otherwise would not be able to obtain it because of their precarious
financial condition. The equities of each individual case of a lender-
borrower controversy will vary, but the loan company may not always
be the "bad guy." Mr. Norman's loan trnasaction was in most respects
very routine and not at all out of the ordinary. The main purpose here
is to discuss Mr. Norman's procedure, not the merits of his case.
Mr. Norman made a few payments, but he soon filed suit against the
lender and asked for various forms of relief. Among his prayers was one
that the note and the deed to secure debt both be declared null and void,
that he receive back all monies which he had paid and that he be
awarded punitive damages. Norman attacked the note and deed as
''usurious," as being a "contract of adhesion," and as being violative
of the Georgia Industrial Loan Company Act." He claimed that the
defendant had been in a superior bargaining position and had been able
to impose oppressive terms on him because of this superior position.
Most important for the purposes of our discussion here, Norman
claimed to represent a class of all customers of the defendant who were
similarly situated.
The defendant immediately moved to strike the class action allega-
tions, but the Hall County Superior Court denied the motion. The court
of appeals affirmed, and this led to the supreme court's enigmatic and
troublesome opinion.
The question presented to the supreme court, as framed by the court
itself, was whether the Georgia class action rule "permits class actions,
where the rights of the alleged class are not derivative and are not joint
rights, but are merely common in that there are common questions of
law or fact involved and a common relief is sought."37 As framed, the
question basically is whether the Georgia rule permits a class suit that
36. GA. CODE ANN. ch. 25 (Rev. 1971).
37. 229 Ga. at 161, 190 S.E.2d at 49.
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would most properly fit under subdivision (b)(3) of the federal rule. The
court answered the question with a unanimious "yes," and, through
Justice Nichols, left lawyers, judges and commentators with the follow-
ing illuminating rationale.
The character of the right sought to be enforced may be common
although the facts may be different as to each member of the alleged
class. The rights may be several in that each member of the alleged
class is dependent upon a different factual situation to establish his
right to prevail, yet they may be of a common character. To hold that
a class action would not apply in a case where the right relied upon is
of a common character, unless the class of action is also joint, would
be to limit class actions to those situations where a permissive joinder
is authorized, but a mandatory joinder is not required.3 1
The defendant-appellant sought a rehearing but its motion was de-
nied. The motion for rehearing relied heavily on Harrison v. Jones."
In that case DeKalb County had refused to turn on the water to the
plaintiff's house because the prior owner had left without paying his
water bills and plaintiff refused to pay the delinquent bills. The superior
court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the county to turn on the
water and also enjoined the county from refusing to give water to any
other persons who were similarly situated. On appeal the supreme court
reversed and as to the class action aspects of the case said,
The complaint in this case does not qualify as a class action in any
particular and for this additional reason the trial judge erred in his
rulings extending his findings to all inhabitants of DeKalb County
occupying a position similar to the complainant.10
Justice Nichols dissented from the decision of the court without opinion.
The original action in Harrison v. Jones was not framed as a class
suit and there was not any real discussion of the appropriateness of class
treatment at the supreme court level. The appellants in Norman argued,
however, that the court had impliedly, if not expressly, held in Harrison
that the Georgia statutes did not recognize a "common question" class
suit. Despite the brevity of the opinion in Harrison and the lack of any
citations of authority or analysis, the import of the decision would
certainly appear to be that such a class suit was not, at that time,
recognized in Georgia. If ever there were a case where class treatment
38. Id. at 162, 190 S.E.2d at 50.
39. 226 Ga. 344, 175 S.E.2d 26 (1970).
40. Id. at 346, 175 S.E.2d at 28.
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might have been appropriate, Harrison was certainly it. The action
sounded partly in equity and class suits are themselves creatures of
equity. The class was clearly defined and limited in size-every person
residing in DeKalb County who was denied water by the county solely
because the previous owner of his home or the previous tenant in his
apartment had failed to pay his water bills. I hesitate to use the key
words "joint," "common," or "several," but suffice it to say that all
such persons shared a single interest, i.e. water. They all had a single
problem, i.e. the previous occupant had not paid his bills. The legal
issues were all the same, and, for the most part, the factual issues were
the same.
Interestingly, the Norman opinion was written by Justice Nichols, the
lone dissenter in Harrison. On the motion for a rehearing, the court in
an unsigned opinion dismissed Harrison as not binding because it con-
flicted with the CPA.
The contention is made upon motion for rehearing that the case of
Harrison v. Jones, 226 Ga. 341 (175 S.E. 2d 26) was overlooked by
the court in rendering the opinion in this case. Such case, while a
physical precedent, is in conflict with the provisions of the Civil Prac-
tice Act, dealt with in the opinion and does not refer to such statutory
provisions. Where there is a conflict between a decision of this court
and an Act of the General Assembly, the Act controls. 4'
Harrison has, therefore, been effectively overrruled insofar as it related
to class actions.
The brief opinion which accompanied the denial of the motion for
rehearing went on to sweep aside the second major thrust of the appel-
lant's arguments in three short sentences. The appellant had argued that
the Norman decision was unclear and inconsistent with the history of
the Georgia class action rule and that for those reasons it could wreak
havoc with the administration of justice in the Georgia courts. The
appellant expressed concern that Norman would spawn a host of spe-
cious class actions that would present enormous and expensive problems
of management to the courts. The supreme court quickly dismissed such
concerns and passed the buck to the General Assembly.
The briefs filed in support of the motion for rehearing in this case also
point out that the decision could create havoc with the judicial system
by flooding the courts with class actions which could clog the wheels
of justice. Assuming that such statements are true, the answer lies with
the General Assembly and not with the Courts. The legislation as
41. 229 Ga. at 162. 190 S.E.2d at 50.
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passed by the General Assembly is clear and any other construction
would require judicial legislation."
The Orwellian newspeak of the last quoted sentence is where the
supreme court and this writer completely part company. I would agree
that the legislation passed by the General Assembly is clear in that the
Assembly clearly enacted into law the 1938 federal rule sans the spu-
rious class action. The Assembly clearly did not enact the 1966 federal
rule and it clearly and specifically did not enact the old spurious action.
What is not clear is what the supreme court decided in the Norman
decision. In fact, Norman is a good example of the problems which
arose under the old federal rule with its juridical right classifications and
which led to the pragmatic, functional approach of the 1966 rule. The
seven justices obviously were not completely sure of the meanings of
"joint" or "common" rights, but that is nothing to be ashamed of
because they are in distinguished company. Professors Chafee, Kalven,
Rosenfeld, Wright, Keefe, Levy and Donovan; Supreme Court Justices
Fortas and Douglas;43 and the advisory committee on the federal rules,
just to name a few, all found the old rule with its "joint" and "common"
classifications to be confusing and difficult to apply.
If Norman had been a federal case, then it most likely would have
fallen under the (b)(3) classification of the 1966 rule as raising common
questions of law or fact. The basic issue was whether the defendant's
standard form contracts were legal. Insofar as the question of legality
went to the forms used generally by the defendant, a common question
of law was clearly raised. On the other hand, the questions of usury,
extra charges and "oppressive" tactics all raised questions that were
peculiarly several and not common. Whether a federal court would have
found Norman to be appropriate for class treatment under the 1966 rule
cannot squarely be answered because not enough facts have been di-
vulged fror a reasoned determination to be made. The point of major
concern for Georgia courts, Georgia litigants and Georgia lawyers is
how are cases like Norman to be handled at the trial level without
further guidance from the supreme court or from the General Assembly.
Five serious questions are immediately apparent:
I. What will be the res judicata effects of decisions in cases following
Norman on the absentee members of the class?
2. Will absentee members of the class be given the option to exclude
42. Id. at 163, 190 S.E.2d at 50-51.
43. See their dissenting opinion in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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themselves from the class or freely to enter an appearance or intervene
in the litigation?
3. Must notice be directed to absentee members of the class? If so,
what kind of notice? How will it be sent? Who will pay for it?
4. What will be the effect of the commencement of a Norman type
class action on relevant statutes of limitation?
5. What will be the guidelines for the management of a large Norman
type class action at the trial level with respect to such matters as
discovery and damage claims?
Neither the Norman opinion nor the Georgia rule itself offers any
answers to the above questions. There have been very few Georgia class
action cases and none of the magnitude of Norman. Therefore, it will
probably be most helpful to look to the federal courts for guidance.
They have had an opportunity to confront a bewildering array of class
actions of all sizes, shapes and dimensions, particularly since the pas-
sage of the 1966 amendments.
Norman, RES JUDICATA, DUE PROCESS AND NOTICE TO ABSENTEES
One of the advantages of a class suit is that it decides an issue involv-
ing a number of different people in a single proceeding. Those members
of the class who are not actually before the court as parties to the
litigation are, as a general rule, bound by the judgment in the case the
same as if they had instituted separate lawsuits on their own. If absentee
class members were not bound by the judgment, there would be little
point in even having a class action. Permissive joinder of parties would
accomplish the same results. Indeed, one of the serious shortcomings of
the old spurious action of the 1938 federal rule was that it only bound
those members actually before the court.
The courts must be careful with class actions that are binding on
absentees whose rights are being protected only by those who have
proclaimed themselves as "representatives" of the class. The American
judicial systems, both federal and state, have always been very con-
cerned with the protection of the "due process" rights of individuals who
have some legal grievance. The class action presents the court with the
difficulty of trying to insure that these rights are protected vicariously.
The response of the federal system has been to require notice to absen-
tees in class actions where the class is not bound together by a close
cohesion of interests. The supreme court in Norman did not address
itself to the question of the res judicata effects of class actions in Geor-
gia, but it did imply that Georgia class actions should be more than
simple joinder devices. And, in fact, it wouldn't make much sense to
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have a class action that doesn't bind anybody other than the representa-
tive parties.
Since notice is inextricably bound up with the due process issues, the
next question is whether notice should now be required in Georgia class
suits. If notice is required, then a host of other questions still remain
about the form of notice, the timing of its issuance, and the allocation
of its cost. Once again, it is helpful to look at the federal experience.
Subdivision (c)(2) of the federal rule requires that "In any action main-
tained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members
of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, includ-
ing individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort." The rule goes on to say that the notice will advise
each member of the class that he may either exclude himself from the
proceedings or that he may make an appearance through counsel. The
judgment in a (b)(3) "common question" action is binding upon all
members of the class, save those who choose to opt out of the proceed-
ings.
The notice requirement is an attempt to strike a balance between the
guarantees of due process and the efficiencies and advantages of the
class action. The United States Supreme Court has recognized, at least
since Smith v. Swormstedt, in 1853,"4 that a representative suit may be
binding on absentee members of a class where the parties plaintiff (or,
conversely, the parties defendant) provide fair and adequate representa-
tion of the interests of the class.
For convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court
of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the
entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if all were
before the court. The legal and equitable rights and liabilities of all
being before the court by representation, and especially where the
subject matter of the suit is common to all, there can be very little
danger but that the interest of all will be properly protected and main-
tained. "
Notice to absentees is one way in which competent representation of the
interests of the class may be assured, for if absentees in a (b)(3) action
believe that their interests are not being protected, they can either ex-
clude themselves or enter an appearance. 6
The pre-1966 federal rule did not provide for notice to absentees. The
44. See note 6 supra.
45. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853).
46. See generally Advisory Committee's Note at 107.
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general feeling was that the classification scheme itself provided all the
necessary procedural due process safeguards for absentees.,7 The spu-
rious class suit was binding only on those persons who were actually
before the court as parties; hence there could be no adverse res judicata
effects on absentees. Of course, there might have been absentees who
would have liked to join the litigation as parties had they been made
aware of it. Persons whose claims were too small to warrant protracted
individual litigation but who could have benefitted from joining a class
suit may in this manner have been denied an opportunity to litigate. But
there was certainly no constitutional requirement that absentees be noti-
fied as they were not to be bound by the judgment. In the "true" class
suit there was a cohesion of interests that made any member of the class
an adequate representative of the interests of the entire class. Likewise,
in the "hybrid" class suit, where the judgment was res judicata only with
respect to the specific property in question, there was a cohesion of
interests with respect to the common property which made notice gener-
ally unnecessary."
The modern (b)(3) action is quite different from the classifications of
the old rule. The members of the class are joined together only by
common questions of law or fact. There may often be a lack of cohesion
in the group; the size of the group may be enormous; and in federal cases
the members of the group may be spread all over the country or even
the world. Unless an absentee affirmatively asks to be excluded from
the class, he will be bound by the judgment in the case. Thus, there are
compelling reasons for making every effort to protect the interests of
absentees.
The advisory committee on the federal rules49 believed that notice was
an absolute prerequisite in a common question class suit because of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Hansberry v. Lee,50 and Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co.5"
In Hansberry there had been a state court class judgment on the same
subject matter as the federal litigation, and the question was whether
that judgment was res judicata as to the members of the class in the
federal action. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Constitution
might permit a judgment in a class suit to bind absentees." However,
47. See 49 B.U.L. REV. 682, 683 (1969).
48. 3B MOORE, 23.10, 23.55.
49. Advisory Committee's Note at 107.
50. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
51. 339 U.S. 306 (1950); and see, Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mul-
lane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 305 (1951).
52. 311 U.S. at 42.
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the Court determined that the absentees in the state action had not been
adequately represented by the parties before the court because the inter-
ests of the absentees and of the representatives were not wholly consis-
tent. Because of the lack of adequate representation the Court held that
the state class action was not binding on the absentees.53 The Hansberry
decision did not specifically hold that notice must be sent to absentees.
It only held that a judgment could not be res judicata as to absentees
unless those absentees had had the benefits of full due process of law.
The Mullane case was not even a class action; rather, it was a pro-
ceeding by the trustee of a common trust for an accounting. The issue
before the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of a state statute
which provided only for notice by publication of a proceeding for a trust
accounting. The statute was held to violate the fourteenth amendment
in that it did not provide a method for the notification of interested
persons who were within the jurisdiction of the court and who were
readily identifiable. The Court went on to say that notice by publication
might be sufficient in certain instances but only for persons whose wher-
eabouts were unknown or whose interests were conjectural. 4 Under
Mullane, the requirements of due process can only be met by giving to
interested persons notice that is
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise inter-
ested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an oppor-
tunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature
as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford
a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance (cita-
tions omitted). 55
The combination of Hansberry and Mullane led the advisory commit-
tee to suggest that individual notice to all absentees was necessary in a
common question class suit.5" Subdivision (c)(2) of the rule does not, by
its terms, require individual notice and there is dispute among the com-
mentators about whether Mullane and Hansberry require such notice.5 7
Those who argue against making individual notice an absolute constitu-
tional requirement in common question class actions believe that the
federal rule contains enough other procedural safeguares to protect the
53. Id. at 44, 45.
54. 339 U.S. at 320.
55. Id. at 314.
56. Advisory Committee's Note at 107.
57. See, e.g., Note, Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3)- The Notice Requirement, 29
MD. L. REV. 139 (1969); Comment, Adequate Representation. Notice and the New Class Action
Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 889 (1968).
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interests of absentees either with or without notice.
.. . The court, consistent with due process, might sanction a rule
which did not include any notice requirement, as long as it guaranteed
that the interests of the absentees were adequately represented.5 1
In Georgia, the Norman decision does not mention notice and the rule
does not require it. Is notice, such as that required by subdivision (c)(l)
of the federal rule or by the decisions of the Supreme Court in
Hansberry and Mullane, necessary in Georgia class actions? There may
be some room for disagreement about the form of notice or the manner
in which it should be issued, but there seems to be little doubt that the
Georgia Constitution 59 and the case law both require some kind of
notice to absentees in a class such as the one in the Norman case.
The Georgia courts have consistently held that notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing are the most fundamental requirements of due
process. Without them there is no safeguarding of the private interests
of persons who may be affected by the governmental proceeding, be it
legislative, administrative or judicial. No specific procedure is guaran-
teed by the due process clause. It is enough that a person has "reasona-
ble notice and opportunity to be heard and to present his claim or
defense, due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding and the
character of the rights which may be affected by it."' 0 There should be
no doubt that a lawsuit affects an interested person's rights in one way
or another, and, therefore, any absentee member of a class should be
entitled to some sort of notice so that he may determine for himself
whether his rights are being adequately protected.
Common sense dictates that notice is necessary in an action like
Norman for the protection of both the plaintiff class and the defendant
and for the administration of the case. The defendant is entitled to know
what he is up against in the litigation so that he can plan his defenses.
He should know whether the class is made up of fifty or five hundred
persons and generally where they are located. The class representative
could provide such information without directing notice to absentees,
but notice would help to define the class and to give the court itself a
58. Comment, 116 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 57 at 911. The author was relying on language
from Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32.
59. GA. CONST. art. I, 111l, provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, except by due process of law." GA. CONST. art. I., IV, provides that "No person shall
be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend his own cause in any of the courts of this State, in
person, by attorney, or both."
60. See, e.g.. Zorn v. Walker, 206 Ga. 181, 56 S.E.2d 511 (1949); City of Macon v. Benson,
175 Ga. 502, 508, 166 S.E.26, 29 (1932).
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clearer understanding of the exact nature of the class. Some of the
absentees might not agree with the representative's definition of the
class and might feel that they should be excluded or that the class should
be enlarged. If the Norman case does, in fact, allow common question
class actions, then if the judgment in such an action is to be binding on
absentee members of the class, it is imperative that they be given some
notice or some opportunity to be heard.
If notice is to be directed to absentee members of a class, several
questions immediately present themselves. What sort of notice is re-
quired? Who should bear the administrative burden of providing the
notice? How should the costs of notice be allocated? When should the
notice be given? Is notice necessary in all class actions or just those
which are similar to the Norman case?
The federal courts have been struggling with the notice problem for
about six years now, and the case law has developed enough so that it
is possible to see some guidelines which can be followed and applied.
The federal courts have dealt with some enormous antitrust and securi-
ties fraud cases, and their experience should certainly be useful to Geor-
gia courts which may be faced with similar problems.
The classic case which has caught the attention of all the commenta-
tors is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin," which has been considered in
considerable detail by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York." Mr. Eisen brought an action in 1966 against the New York
Stock Exchange and certain brokerage houses on behalf of himself and
all purchasers of "odd lots" of securities during the years 1962-1966 for
alleged antitrust violations. The class was composed of several millions
of persons who resided in every state in the union and in "most of the
non-communist countries in the world."" ' Some two million members
of the class were readily identifiable from the records of certain of the
61. In its most recent posture, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), but that decision is now on
appeal to the Second Circuit.
62. When the case was first brought, the district court decided that a class suit was not
maintainable. 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The Second Circuit then held that the denial of a
class action was appealable, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). Later
the Second Circuit, indicating that a class suit might be appropriate, sent the case back to the
district court for further findings on the class action question. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). On
remand, the district court requested further information from the parties. 50 FR.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). The court then found a class suit to be maintainable and decided on the notice discussed in
the body of the paper. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). After a preliminary hearing, the court
allocated the costs of notice. 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
63. 52 F.R.D. at 258.
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brokerage firms. 4 Sending notice to each of them by first class mail
would have been prohibitively expensive at the rate of ten cents per
letter. Mr. Eisen's claim was only for seventy dollars and the claims of
other members of the class were also comparatively small. For such
small claims it hardly made economic sense to spend $200,000 on indi-
vidual notice. The court's response was an interesting and novel proce-
dure.
I. The plaintiff offered to send individual notice to all member firms
of the New York Stock Exchange and to all commercial banks with
large trust departments. The court agreed that this might give at least
indirect notice to a large number of class members,
2. The court further ordered individual notice to be mailed to the
two thousand or so class members who had ten or more transactions
during the relevant period, and to five thousand other class members
selected at random.
3. Finally, the court directed that a one-fourth page advertisement
should be run once a month for two months in the national edition of
the Wall Street Journal, and in the financial sections of the New York
Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, the San Francisco Examiner and
the Los Angeles Times. 5
The court placed most of the administrative burden of sending the
notice on the plaintiff. Despite the attempts of the court to lessen the
costs of the notice, it still presented a bill of over $20,000, and the court
had to make some determination about payment. This presented a di-
lemma.
If the expense of notice is placed upon plaintiff, it would be the end of
a possibly meritorious suit, frustrating both the policy behind private
antitrust actions and the admonition that the New Rule 23 is to be
given a liberal rather than a restrictive interpretation . . . On the other
hand, if costs were arbitrarily placed upon defendants at this point, the
result might be the imposition of an unfair burden founded upon a
groundless claim. In addition to the probability of encouraging frivo-
lous class actions, such a step might also result in defendant's passing
on to their customers, including many of the class members in this
case, the expenses of defending these actions. 66
The dilemma was so great that Judge Tyler could not decide the issue
and ordered a preliminary hearing on the merits of the case to enable
64. Id. at 257.
65. Id. at 267-68.
66. Id. at 269.
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him to make a judgment one way or the other about allocating costs.
At the preliminary hearing the merits appeared on the surface to be with
the plaintiff, and the judge ordered the defendants to bear ninety per
cent of the cost of notice."
Many other courts have also considered the notice problem in some
detail. They have come up with a variety of solutions, and although few
have been faced with problems as monstrous as those in Eisen, no set
guidelines have yet been formulated. In some cases, courts have required
individual notice by first class mail to all absentees; but in those cases,
the classes have usually been fairly small and the identities of the absen-
tees readily ascertainable. 8 Where it has been determined that the ident-
ities of some, or all, of the members of the class are not readily ascer-
tainable, then the general trend has been to allow notice by publication,
or in the alternative, to mail notice to those who may be reached easily
and to publish notice for the remainder."
The federal rule itself does not provide any specific guidelines for the
form of notice so long as it is the "best practicable under the circum-
stances." One commentator has suggested a range of five possibilities
which can be tailored to fit a variety of fact situations: (1) individual
notice to all absentees, (2) individual notice only to those absentees
readily ascertainable from a mailing list in the possession of a party, (3)
individual notice to a random sample of absentees, (4) individual notice
to all those who have a claim above a certain amount set by the court,
and (5) notice by publication.70 To these five should be added the sixth
possibility of a combination of two or more forms of notice, e.g.
publication plus individual notice to a random sample.
The notice itself should identify the parties and include a brief de-
scription of the complaint and the answer and of the procedure to be
followed in the litigation. In all cases, the language of the notice should
be as neutral as possible.
The courts have not come up with a clear answer to the question of
who should bear the administrative burden of issuing notice. There is
67. 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
68. See, e.g.. Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. II (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a consolidated hearing of five
securities cases. In four of them notice by mail was ordered with supplemental notice by publica-
tion. In the fifth case, identification of the absentees was difficult; hence, publication alone was
ordered. Id. at 21. See also, Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), Contract
Buyers League v. F. & F. Inv. Co., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969), Illinois v. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969) and Bragalini v. Biblowitz, 13 FED. RULES SERV.
2d 23b.3, Case 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
69. See, e.g.. Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465, 472 (N.D. III. 1967).
70. Comment, 116 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 57 at 918.
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general agreement that the court should keep the issuance of notice
under close scrutiny in order to avoid the possibility of actual or appar-
ent solicitation on the part of one or the other party.7 In most instances,
the representative party of the class in question should probably handle
the mechanics of notice, 2 although at least one court seems to think that
even the mechanical functions of notice should be handled by the court
itself in order to insure an air of "detached impartiality."73 Sometimes
the clerical work should logically shift to the class' opponent where, for
instance, the opponent has in his possession a mailing list of the class
members and the clerical machinery to send out notice.74 If individual
notice is required and the court orders one of the parties to handle the
administrative details, then the notice statement prepared by the respon-
sible party is usually submitted to the opposing party for objections.
Upon agreement of the parties and the court as to wording, it is usually
sent out upon court stationery.
The mechanical and clerical problems of preparing and issuing notice
may be of considerable inconvenience to both-the parties and the court,
but costs are a much larger problem. As pointed out above, the esti-
mated costs of sending individual notice by mail to the absentees in
Eisen were some $200,000. For a plaintiff with a seventy dollar claim,
that is a rather stiff price to pay for the privilege of maintaining a class
action. Likewise, it is a rather stiff price for a defendant to have to pay,
especially when there has been no hearing on the merits, and when, even
if the defendant should prevail, his chances of reimbursement are slim.
Eisen is, of course, an extreme example, but even in a more manageable
case notice can be quite expensive.76
71. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee. 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 398 (1967).
72. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 44
(1967).
73. School District v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001, 1005 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
74. See. e.g.. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
75. See, generally cases cited note 68 supra. This procedure is in general accord with the
suggestions of Professor Wright. See, Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Judicial Confer-
ence, Third Judicial Circuit of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 437, 565 (1967).
76. For instance, in Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a (b)(3) action under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the class had about 16,000 members. Costs of individual
notice were figured at $2,500. Publication of a one-eighth page advertisement in both the New York
Times and the Wall Street Journal once a month for three successive months was estimated to
cost $9,700. The outcome in the Berland case was amicable enough. The plaintiffs were able to
bear the cost of the mailing, and since both sides were desirous of a class action, the court ruled
that if publication was later deemed necessary, then the adversaries would share publication costs
equally.
However, not all plaintiffs with meritorious claims would be able to muster up $2,500, or even a
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There seems to be no set standard for the allocation of the costs of
notice. Eisen is one approach, although there Judge Medina of the
Second Circuit had earlier indicated in a dictum that the representative
party should bear the costs.77 Judge Medina's rule seems too strict and
inconsistent with the desired flexibility of federal rule 23. It could be
disastrous for the small claimant who does not have large financial
resources. In some cases the costs of notice might have to be allocated
to the class' opponent if the class action is to be maintained. One court
has suggested a flexible standard, which is not free from difficulties
itself, but which leaves the question largely in the discretion of the trial
judge.
Where the claim appears to be a meritorious one and defendants desire
it to be prosecuted through a class action, it does not seem unreasona-
ble to require the corporate defendant to share the cost of notice,
particularly in a case where the plaintiffs may be able to reimburse the
corporation if the claim is dismissed. On the other hand, where the
claim's merit is doubtful, the cost of notice is high, the defendants have
no particular desire to gain the advantages of class res judicata, and
plaintiffs would be unable in the event of dismissal to reimburse the
corporation, plaintiffs should be required to pay out the initial expense
rather than obtain a 'free ride' at the corporation's expense. 8
When faced with burdensome notice problems, some courts have
reacted by dismissing the class action.79 It is certainly appropropriate
to weigh the burdens of notice in determining whether a class suit is
properly maintainable,0 but the court should be careful not to allow
notice to be its only or its major concern. Rather, the trial judge should
much lesser amount. Publication costs might be lower in less prestigious newspapers out in the
provinces, but they could still be relatively high. One is also faced with the old problem of the
effectiveness of legal ads of any sort. No cost-benefit analysis of newspaper notices has been made
as far as this author knows, but common sense would indicate that the cost-efficiency ratio of such
ads would be quite low, especially if the class were to consist of lower income members who were
not avid newspaper readers. The logical outcome of this line of thinking is that if individual notice
is impracticable, then perhaps random sample notice might be the only feasible alternative.
77. 391 F.2d at 564.
78. Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. at 132. Such a test does, however, require the trial judge to
make some determination as to the merits of a particular claim very early in the proceedings.
79. See. e.g.. Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) and School
District v. Harper & Row, 267 F. Supp. 1001. In neither of these cases was the burden of notice
the only reason for dismissing the class suit but notice problems did weigh very heavily in the final
decisions of the courts.
80. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D.
Pa. 1968); and Note, The Use of Federal Rule 23 in Private Antitrust Enforcement, 20 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 949, 962 (1969).
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look to the various procedural safeguards which are available to insure
the protection of the interests of the absentees in a manner that is
consonant with the requirements of due process." Unfortunately, the
Georgia rule does not offer any guidelines, nor does the Norman opin-
ion.
Another commentator has suggested four basic considerations to be
weighed by a federal judge in determining whether a class action should
be dismissed because of the burdens of notice: (1) the expense of notice,
of whatever form, as compared with the recovery sought; (2) the nature
of the suit-Is it likely that any number of the class have an especially
large stake (individual notice might be sent to them); (3) Is it likely that
a great many absentees would opt out? (If so, that may be an indication
of a specious claim or of inadequate representation.); and (4) Is there
any likelihood that the cause of action would ever be brought as any-
thing other than a class action if dismissed now?82 A fifth consideration
would also seem to be of importance-the desirability of wide res judi-
cata effects for the respective parties. All of these considerations would
seem applicable to a Norman case.
There is also a question in the federal courts about the necessity of
notice to absentees in (b)(l) and (b)(2) actions. A dictum in one of the
Eisen opinions indicates that due process requires notice in all class suits
whether they fall into the (b)(l), (b)(2) or (b)(3) classification." By
requiring notice in (b)(l) and (b)(2) actions, it may be possible to avoid
subsequent collateral attacks on the judgment for mis-classification. 4
Several courts have indicated their general agreement with the Eisen
dictum. 5
By the terms of the rule, notice is manadatory only in (b)(3) actions,
although the court does have the discretion to require notice in any
action. 86 It would seem advisable to avoid raising notice in (b)(l) and
(b)(2) actions to the level of a constitutional due process requirement.87
There is no apparent need to extend or to exacerbate the problems of
81. Comment, 116 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 57 at 918.
82. Note 47 supra at 692.
83. 391 F.2d at 364-65.
84. Note 47 supra at 706.
85. Fowles v. American Export Lines, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 1293, 1295, n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Clark v. American Marine Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305, 1306 (E.D. La. 1969): Cranston v. Freeman,
290 F. Supp. 785. 787 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2): andsee, Johnson v. Georgia H'waj€ Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122
(5th Cir. 1969).
87. Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968), 3B MOORE,
23.55: Advisory Committee's Note at 106.
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notice when due process can be adequately protected under the existing
provisions of the rule. As pointed out previously, the interests of the
members of a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class generally are more cohesive than the
interests of the members of a (b)(3) class. The need for notice to absen-
tees is, therefore less as the class representatives are less likely to be
inadequate. "We think that the essential requisite of due process as to
absent members of the class is not notice, but the adequacy of represen-
tation of their interests by named parties.""8
Of course, Georgia does not have a (b)(1) or a (b)(2) classification.
Notice was not required by the 1938 federal rule in true and hybrid
actions for reasons previously discussed. If an action clearly fits into the
mold of an old fashioned true or hybrid class suit, notice is probably
not necessary, but for Norman type actions, the federal (b)(3) guidelines
seem most appropriate. This merely points up another problem with
Norman-the trial court has to go through a categorization procedure
at the outset before any of the merits of the suit are reached.
There are several ways in which the notice problems could be amelio-
rated. A recent article suggested that subdivision (c)(2) of the federal
rule be amended to strike the word "identified" and to substitute there-
for the word "notified," so that individual notice would only be required
for absentees who could be "notified [rather than identified] through
reasonable effort."8 9
Eisen and other securities cases come immediately to mind. As a
general rule, brokerage houses have mailing lists of their customers and
corporations have mailing lists of their shareholders, thereby making
identification of absentees relatively simple. But it is the cost of notifica-
tion which usually presents the largest problems. By making the "rea-
sonable effort" standard applicable to "notification" rather than "iden-
tification," it would be easier for the trial court to dispense with individ-
ual notice in cases where the costs would be prohibitive.
There is also the possibility of using alternative forms of notice,9 such
as publication. In some instances, however, publication may be more
expensive than individual notice and certainly it is less effective.9 The
88. Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. at 636: and see Dole, supra note 24 at
1127.
89. Note, 29 MD. L. REV., supra note 57 at 154.
90. See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp,, 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn. 1968).
-[This] court does not interpret this [(c)(2)] as requiring personal notice from the court itself but
as permitting the court to direct one or some of the parties to give notice in such form as the court
may approve.
91. See, e.g., Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121.
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trial judge in one securities case took judicial notice of the widespread
publicity concerning the suit in financial circles and took it into consid-
eration in ruling on the notice question." By analogy, if the members
of a class all belong to some form of cooperative organization, or if they
all live in the same neighborhood, then "intra-group channels of com-
munication" may make it possible to provide only minimal official
notice.93 Random sample notice has already been suggested as one
possibility. Other alternatives might include spot announcements in
magazines that may be read by large numbers of the class. There is no
real reason for judges to feel absolutely confined to individual notice or
to the publication of an easily missed legal advertisement in a newspa-
per.
In order to soften the costs of notice, one judge has suggested that
the court itself should bear the expense of issuing notice in situations
where it would be inequitable or impossible for either party to do so."
But it is questionable whether the courts, either in Georgia or elsewhere,
could afford the cost of notice without greater appropriations.
The questions of notice and of adequate representation are both di-
rectly related to due process and are so closely intertwined that discus-
sion of one leads necessarily to discussion of the other. There is no
substantial difference between the old and the new federal rules or the
Georgia rule except that the 1966 federal rule puts an increased empha-
sis on adequate representation in its formal language due to the ex-
panded res judicata effects of class judgments. 5 The requirement of
adequate representation of course, becomes much more important as
the binding effects of a class judgment are expanded. The United States
Supreme Court said in Hansberry v. Lee:
It is one thing to say that some members of a class may represent other
numbers in a litigation where the sole and common interests of the
class in the litigation is either to assert a common right or to challenge
an asserted obligation [citations omitted]. It is quite another to hold
that all those who are free alternatively either to assert rights or to
challenge them are of a single class so constituted, may be deemed
adequately to represent any others of the class in litigating their inter-
ests in either alternative. Such a selection of representatives for pur-
poses of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily or
even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to represent,
92. Herbst v, Able, 47 F.R.D. 1I.
93. Dole, supra note 24 at 1127.
94. Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. at 132.
95. 3B MOORE, 23.07(I)-(2): 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 567, at 108 (Supp. 1969).
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does not afford that protection to absent parties which due process
requires."
It would be impossible to set any hard and fast rules about what
constitutes adequate representation because of the great factual vari-
ances among class units, and neither the federal nor the Georgia rule
attempts to do so. The matter should be primarily within the discretion
of the trial judge, and over the years the courts have developed some
general guidelines. The courts must be particularly careful about settle-
ments in class suits so that the rights of absentees are not prejudiced by
greedy representatives and their lawyers.
The representative party must be a member of the class that he pur-
ports to represent. 7 For instance, in some instances organizations have
sought standing to sue as class representatives of their members for the
redress of alleged individual injuries to the members. But the courts
have generally held that an organization may sue as a class representa-
tive only when there has been an injury to the organization itself as well
as to the individual members of the group. 8 This does not mean that
an organization cannot serve to define the bounds of the class when
individual members sue on behalf of all other members of the organiza-
tion .
The interests of the representatives must be coextensive with the inter-
ests of the class members and the representatives must not have interests
that are antagonistic to those of the absentees.'"" One of the reasons that
the Supreme Court refused to extend the binding effects of the state
court class judgment in Hansberry was that the interests of the plaintiff
representatives in the first suit were antagonistic to the interests of the
absentees. Common sense should make it apparent that a party cannot
adequately represent the interests of absentees if his own interests in the
litigation are contrary to those of some, or all, of the absentees. Under
the federal rule the trial judge may require the parties to reframe the
issues in such a way that antagonisms are removed, or he may require
the intervention of additional representative parties. He should have the
96. 311 U.S. at 44-45.
97. See, e.g.. Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Norwalk Core v. Norwalk
Redev. Agency, 42 F.R.D. 617 (D. Conn. 1967).
98. See, e.g., National Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D.N.Y. 1969);
Wisconsin State Employees Council 24 v. Wisconsin Nat. Resources Bd., 298 F. Supp. 339 (W.D.
Wis. 1969).
99. See. e.g., Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv. Co., 300 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. I1. 1969).
100. See, e.g., Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. I1; Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472: Pelelas v.
Caterprillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 700 (1940).
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authority to do the same in Georgia but, once again, neither the rule
nor Norman says anything.
Finally, most courts have required that the representatives have com-
petent counsel who are capable of handling a sizable class action.' o
Since there are obviously no fixed standards for determining the compe-
tency of counsel, the trial court is left with considerable latitude. One
commentator has suggested that it might be more relevant to look to
the financial abilities of the counsel.' The economic burdens of a large
and lengthy class suit could be heavy on a lawyer, especially a lawyer
with impecunious clients.
In the past, some courts applied a quantitative test to determine the
adequacy of representation. For instance, if the class were numerous,
then it was felt that a fairly sizable number of representatives should
be before the court. Likewise, it was thought that the claims of the
representatives should reflect in quantity, as well as in kind, the average
claims of the class.103 In addition to quantitative factors, courts have
also considered silence on the part of absentees, a failure of anyone else
to bring an action, the failure of absentees to intervene, and the failure
of absentees to make any response after having been served with notice
to be relevant factors to consider in determining whether the parties
before the court were adequate representatives.' 4
The trend in the federal courts seems to be toward the broadest
possible qualitative tests for adequacy of representation. A single indi-
vidual may be an adequate representative of a tremendous class with
huge cumulative claims. 05 If absentees inform the court of their displea-
sure with the representation, then the court has to make a more search-
ing inquiry, "but the representative party cannot be said to have an
affirmative duty to demonstrate that the whole or a majority of the class
considers his representation adequate."'0 6 As examples, it has been held
that a single taxpayer was an adequate representative of all taxpayers
in a given political subdivision, 07 that five franchises were adequate
representatives of a class of some 650 franchises in an antitrust suit,'"'
101. See, e.g., 300 F. Supp. 210; 47 F.R.D. 11; Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C.
1969): 113 F.2d 629.
102. 47 N.C.L. REv. 393, 398 (1969).
103. See, e.g., Berger v. Purolator Prods. Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 113 F.2d 629.
104. See, e.g., Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202; Hohmann v. Parkard Instrument Co.,
399 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'g43 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. I1l. 1967); Booth v. General Dynamics
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465.
105. Eisen is clearly among the more extreme cases.
106. 391 F.2d at 563.
107. Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465.
108. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. (N.D. Cal. 1967).
CLASS ACTIONS
and that four plaintiffs could represent a class of over 200,000 members
in a securities fraud case. 09
One of the primary purposes of notice in federal "common question"
class suits is to inform absentees that they can opt out of the litigation
if they so desire and thus be able to avoid the res judicata effects of the
judgment. Norman doesn't say anything about self-exclusion nor does
the Georgia rule. If the Norman decision has in fact opened up a com-
mon question class action-and it certainly seems to have done so-then
the courts and the General Assembly should give serious consideration
to the opt-out privilege. There is no better judge than the individual
himself when it comes to a decision about when, where, how and
whether to litigate. It would seem grossly unfair in a common question
class suit not to let a person make up his own mind about whether he
wants to be represented by the parties before the court.
Notice to absentees can pose large problems, particularly if the par-
ties before ths court are not wealthy. It does seem, however, to be a
requisite in large class actions, and the Georgia courts must face up to
the problems and borrow ideas from the federal courts to find feasible
solutions. Unless the notice problems are overwhelming, notice alone
should not be an excuse for denying class treatment to an action which
meets the standards of Norman-albeit those standards are vague
enough.
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
From time to time the federal courts had some difficulties with the
application of relevant statutes of limitation under the 1938 class action
rule. The major question was whether or not the commencement of a
class suit halted the running of the statute as to all members of the class.
The federal practice should give Georgia courts some guidance at least
with respect to true and hybrid actions, and it may offer some clues
about the effect of Norman on tolling statutes of limitation.
Under the 1938 rule, the commencement of a true class suit tolled the
statute and the commencement of a hybrid action tolled any statute
relative to the common property in question." 0 It would seem that the
same should logically hold true in Georgia.
The spurious class suit presented the problem of one way intervention,
a problem which was one of the justifications for doing away with the
spurious action in 1966. Because the judgment in a spurious action was
109. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. at 498.
110. See generallv 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 568.
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binding only on the named parties, absentees, would often wait until the
last moment to see which way the action was likely to go before inter-
vening to join in the spoils."' The courts split on the question of tolling
in spurious actions. Some required each intervenor to be able to satisfy
the statute of limitations at the time of his intervention."' Others held
that the commencement of a spurious action tolled the statute for all
subsequent intervenors."'
The 1966 rule tries to solve the one way intervention problem by
extending the binding effects of a judgment to absentees. The logical
result should be that, except for those who choose to opt out of (b)(3)
actions, the statutes of limitation are tolled for all class members by the
commencement of a class suit."' The weight of recent opinion certainly
substantiates this view." 5 If the statute were not tolled, then class mem-
bers might be forced to intervene or to file cautionary suits. Such a
procedure would be wasteful, expensive and time consuming for litigants
and courts. Not surprisingly, the Norman opinion failed to discuss or
to consider the issue of statutes of limitation. If the Georgia courts
should adopt broad res judicata standards for class suits such as
Norman, then it is hoped that they would also follow the sensible ap-
proach of the federal courts and hold that the commencement of a class
suit tolls the relevant statutes of limitation.
What will happen if, after the commencement of a class suit, it is
determined that the action should not proceed in class form? The advi-
sory committee's note on the 1966 federal rule was not too helpful on
this point.
I II. See generally 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 768, 772 (1965).
112. P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity PatternCo., 25 F.R.D. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (dictum);
Athas v. Day, 161 F. Supp. 916 (D. Colo. 1958); Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives v. Deckert,
123 F.2d 979 (3rd Cir. 1941).
113. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965); Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp. v. Nisley. 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir.). cert. deniedsub. non., Wade v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Co.. 371 U.S. 801 (1962); Kam Koon Wan v. E. E. Black, Ltd., 75 F. Supp. 553 (D. Hawaii 1948);
Wright v. U.S. Rubber Co., 69 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Iowa 1946); York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143
F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 79 (1945); andsee, Keefe, Levy,
and Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben-Hur, 33 CONN. L.Q. 327, 339-42 (1948).
114. See. 3B MOORE 23.90(3). The time for intervention, however, is not unlimited since all
interventions are required to be "timely" by rule 24, and the court can set a reasonable time limit
for intervention. See, Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 385 F.2d 122 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 995 (1968).
115. See, Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 574 (D. Minn. 1968);
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Esplin
v. Hirschi. 402 F.2d 94. 101, n. 14 (10th Cir. 1967); 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 568, at 115-17
(Supp. 1969); Cohn, 54 GEO. L.J. supra note 22, at 1224, n. 86; but cf Comment, Class Actions
Under New Rule 23 and Federal Statutes of Limitations: A Study of Conflicting Rationale, 13
VILL. L. REV. 370 (1968).
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[T]he question whether the intervenors in the nonclass action shall be
permitted to claim . . . the benefit of the date of the commencement
of the action for the purposes of statutes of limitation [is] to be decided
by reference to the laws governing . . . limitations as they apply in the
particular contexts." 6
If the statute in such a situation is not tolled, class litigants might
again be faced with the possible need to file a precautionary individual
action. On the other hand, tolling might give unscrupulous plaintiffs the
chance to file a specious class suit in order to harass the defendant and
to gain time for the preparation of an individual action. The latter
problem seems somewhat more remote than the former, which would
face all potential class litigants, scrupulous as well as unscrupulous.
It has been suggested by one commentator that putative class mem-
bers who have relied in good faith on the commencement of a class suit
to toll the statute should be allowed the benefit of tolling if that action
is dismissed as a class suit." 7 Of course, the running of the statute would
be halted only from the time of the commencement of the action to the
time of its dismissal as a class suit. One court has proposed a more
refined test. If the action is dismissed because of an absence of the
essential requisites of a class suit, then class members would not receive
any tolling benefits. Conversely, if the action meets the fundamental
requirements of a class suit but is dismissed for reasons of "judicial
housekeeping," i.e., it presents too many administrative problems, then
class members would receive the benefits of tolling.
GENERAL MANAGEMENT OF THE CLASS SUIT
The 1966 federal rule and the decisions under it have given the federal
courts the basic guidelines necessary for the management of large class
suits. Because neither the Georgia rule nor Norman give much guid-
ance, the Georgia courts will have to fashion their own guidelines on a
case by case basis until the General Assembly or the supreme court
clarifies matters. Some of the more serious problems have already been
discussed, but the Georgia courts will be faced with practical problems
of handling discovery, settlement, damage claims, lawyers' fees and the
like.
Discovery in a large class suit will always be a problem, no matter
what the courts do. The federal courts have sometimes appointed a
special master to handle discovery. This has worked well in an antitrust
116. Advisory Committee's Note at 104.
117. 35 FORD. L. REV. 295, 308-09 (1966).
1973]
MERCER LAW REVIEW
class action in which this author is now involved, and a similar technique
might be used by the state courts. The federal courts, of course, have
considerable leeway under subdivision (d) of rule 23 to make orders in
the conduct of class action to make the litigation run more smoothly. " '
If "common question" class suits are to be maintained in Georgia, the
General Assembly really should consider the amendment of the rule to
provide local judges with the discretionary powers their federal counter-
parts have under subdivision (d).
Damages often present the most difficult problems of discovery and
proof in large class suits. The question of liability may be fairly simple,
but there may be several thousand class members with differing dam-
ages and differing proof. The federal courts have adopted a sort of
delaying tactic. An action, otherwise maintainable as a class suit, will
not be dismissed simply because damages will be hard to prove. Rather,
the courts will try the liability issue first, and then, if plaintiffs win, the
damages questions will be considered."' This eminently sensible ap-
proach means that the damages issues may be avoided altogether if
defendants prevail on the merits of the litigation. Even if plaintiffs win
at the trial level, the defendants may still win the liability issue on appeal
and everyone will be spared the damages problem.
Lawyers' fees are tied in with the question of improper solicitation,
one of the matters with which Judge Edenfield of the Northern District
of Georgia was concerned in the case quoted in the introduction of this
paper. Class suits can have a great appeal for the lawyer who is looking
to make a fat litigation fee, if his fee is based on a percentage of the
entire recovery. Protracted litigation can be a great financial burden for
a lawyer, and if he wins for the whole class, he should be entitled to a
good fee. However, there are many ethical problems involved in com-
munications between lawyers and absentees regarding fees and the gen-
eral setting of fees for a lawyer who is, in theory, counsel to one litigant,
but who, in fact, represents many litigants. The Georgia courts will have
to be wary of unscrupulous attorneys who may be tempted by the lure
of a large fee to violate the ethical standards of the bar. The potential
for solicitation and improper use of the judicial process may, in fact,
be reason enough for the denial of class treatment for some litigation.'
118. See generally, Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of Class Actions. A Consideration of
Subdivision (d), 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 577 (1968).
119. See American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D.
III. 1969).
120. See Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Advisory Commit-
tee's Note at 103: Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation § 1.61.
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Finally, the Georgia courts or the General Assembly must fashion
some way to handle settlements in class suits. In any large class suit, it
is probable that the question of settlement will arise at some time in the
litigation. The federal courts have authority to review settlement agree-
ments and to take whatever action is necessary to protect the absentees'
interests.' It is especially important to be careful that the representa-
tive parties adequately represent the interests of the absentees when
settlement talks come up. The court is the only agency that is finally
responsible for the protection of the rights of absentees, and it must be
sure that the representative litigants do not compromise those rights.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the supreme court in Norman has created a
species of class suit in Georgia that did not exist before and which the
General Assembly probably never intended to exist. In doing so, the
court did not face up to any of the problems created by its new class
suit and made no attempt to fashion guidelines for the lower courts. In
this paper some of the problems created by Norman have been identified
and briefly discussed. For the sake of the courts, of lawyers, and of
litigants, the supreme court must clarify its decision in Norman or the
General Assembly must amend the Georgia class action rule so that the
courts will have some means of handling the host of problems which
Norman is likely to spawn.
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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